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Two experiments with upright and inverted face and object images were carried out to investigate whether face processing in
autism is more feature-based than in individuals with typical development. Participants were 17 high-ability adolescents with autistic
disorder (16–24 years), 24 typically developing children (9–10 years) and 16 adults (18–33 years). In Experiment 1, a normal in-
version effect was found for the adolescents with autism in a standard face recognition paradigm with reduced memory demands,
except for a subgroup with low social intelligence who were not better in recognizing upright relative to inverted photographs of
faces. In Experiment 2, the group with autism did not show the composite effect like the adult group did: they recognized face halves
as well in aligned composite faces as in non-aligned composite faces. The results on the inversion task suggest that most adolescents
with autism form a normal configuration-based face representation, but the absence of the composite effect indicates that they are
less prone to use the contextual information of the face in a visual-search task.
 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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One of the most intriguing findings in the study of
face perception in people with autism is their relatively
good performance on tasks with inverted photographs
of faces (Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 1978;
Tantam, Monagham, Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989).
However, comparison and interpretation of these find-
ings is rather complicated, because different tasks were
used. In the study of Langdell (1978), children with
autism (mean age 14.1 years) were better than a control
group in recognizing peers from inverted photographs,
although also for the children with autism recognition in
the inverted condition was more difficult than in the
upright condition. Hobson et al. (1988) found that ad-
olescents with autism were superior to controls in both
expression and identity matching when photographs* Corresponding author. Fax: +31-13-466-2370.
E-mail address: b.degelder@kub.nl (B. de Gelder).
0278-2626/$ - see front matter  2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights res
doi:10.1016/S0278-2626(03)00042-3were presented upside-down. The children with autism
(mean age 12.1 years) in the Tantam et al. (1989) study
were as good as controls in labeling inverted photo-
graphs of expressions, but they were less successful than
controls at labeling upright facial expressions.
In the numerous studies with adults and children with
typical development, the so-called inversion effect is
defined as the difference in performance between upright
and inverted photographs of faces (see Farah, Tanaka,
& Drain, 1995; Valentine, 1988, for reviews). In most
experiments, the inversion effect on faces is compared to
effects of inversion on other classes of stimuli. It appears
that faces, compared to other stimuli, are dispropor-
tionately sensitive to inversion (e.g., Dallett, Wilcox, &
DAndrea, 1968; Yin, 1969). It would be interesting, in
view of the previous findings with children and adoles-
cents with autism, to examine whether people with au-
tism show a smaller inversion effect than controls in this
frequently used paradigm. The use of such a paradigm
facilitates the application of current theories of faceerved.
286 J.-P. Teunisse, B. de Gelder / Brain and Cognition 52 (2003) 285–294processing on task performance of people with autism.
This may help us understand a little more about the way
they perceive and process faces.
Diamond andCarey (1986) suggest that there are some
critical conditions that have to bemet for a large inversion
effect. In the first place, the stimulus must be member of a
class with a shared configuration. Secondly, these mem-
bers should be identifiable on the basis of second-order
relational features (distinctive relations among the ele-
ments of this configuration). And finally, the individuals
must be experts on the stimulus class. They found that
these criteria were met with face stimuli, but also when
dog experts had to recognize inverted photographs of
dogs (Diamond&Carey, 1986). For faces this expertise is
acquired from infancy on and reaches its adult level in
puberty. For other stimulus classes like birds, dogs etc.
expertise can still be acquired in adulthood (Diamond &
Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). This notion of ex-
pertise dependency of configural face recognition was
supported by studies of the development of face pro-
cessing. Younger children process and recognize a face by
attending to a greater degree to parts and their ability to
attend to the overall configuration is not fully developed
till about age 12 (Carey, Diamond, &Woods, 1980). The
dependence of configural encoding on age is explained by
the hypothesis of norm-based coding of faces, which
proposes that the facial relations may be stored as a set of
norms that represents the central tendency of faces
(Rhodes & McLean, 1990). As the representation of the
norm getsmore completely specified with experience, face
encoding becomes more efficient (Ellis, 1992). The rela-
tional features are less accessible in the inverted mode,
resulting in different, more feature-based encoding of in-
verted faces.
Carey and Diamond (1977) and Carey et al. (1980)
found exactly the same pattern of results in a study with
children as Tantam et al. (1989) found with people with
autism; upside-down faces were recognized as well as
upright faces. Flin (1985) however, showed that this was
due to floor effects. When she reduced task demands by
decreasing the number of test items and prolonging the
exposure duration of the inspection stimuli, she found
that even 7-year-olds were more accurate on upright
faces than on inverted faces. Furthermore, she found
that recognition of inverted faces improved between 7
and 16 years of age, but not as much as the recognition
of upright faces. This confirms that experience with the
stimulus is important for the inversion effect.
Two experiments were carried out in the present
study. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis was that floor
effects might have influenced the inversion effect found
by Tantam et al. (1989) and that people with autism will
show an inversion effect under different task demands.
To reduce the likelihood of floor effects in our study, the
inversion effect of faces in high-functioning adolescents
with autism was explored with a relatively easy recog-nition task. A two-alternative forced-choice test for
recognition was presented directly after each inspection
item, instead of first learning an inspection list and then
testing. This paradigm reduces memory demands, and
therefore adolescents with autism and children have a
better chance of showing effects. If adolescents with
autism still did not show a decline in performance on
inverted faces and/or a higher recognition accuracy on
inverted faces than typically developed adults or chil-
dren, the claim that people with autism do not show an
inversion effect would receive stronger support. In the
second experiment, a multiple choice version of the
composite task developed by Young, Hellawell, and
Hay (1987) was administered to study in more detail the
processing style of people with autism. In this task, top
and bottom halves of different faces are fused to form a
new facial configuration. In typically developed adults
and children, recognition of the upper face half is more
difficult when it is aligned with the bottom half, thereby
forming a new facial configuration, then when the face
halves are not aligned. This composite effect is only
found in the upright orientation. It is hypothesized that
if people with autism have a more feature-based instead
of configuration-based processing style for faces, they
will not show the composite effect.2. Experiment 1: The inversion task
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
The participants were 17 adolescents with autism, 24
typically developing children, and 16 typically developed
adults. The children (12 males and 12 females) were 9
and 10 years old. They attended primary school in Til-
burg. The adults (8 males and 8 females; mean age 23;1
years) were undergraduate students at Tilburg Univer-
sity.
The adolescents with autism (13 males and 4 females)
were drawn from an institute for high-functioning
adolescents with autism, the Dr. Leo Kannerhuis in
Oosterbeek. The age range was 16–24 years (mean 19;5
years; SD 2;2 years). They satisfied the diagnostic cri-
teria for the autistic disorder according to DSM-IV
(1994). Only individuals with a total IQ score in the
normal range (above 85) were included to ensure that
they were able to understand the test instructions, and
that performance was specific to autism rather than
mental retardation. Verbal IQ (mean 90,0; SD 11,6) was
prorated from Vocabulary and Similarities of the
WAIS-R. Visuoperceptual IQ (mean 115,6; SD 18,5)
was prorated from Block Design of the WAIS-R and
Form Board of the GIT, a Dutch test asking the par-
ticipant to draw lines showing how pieces fit into outline
(similar to Visualization 1 in the manual kit of factor-
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1976).
Social intelligence (mean 92,9; SD 17,1) was assessed
with two tests. WAIS-Picture Arrangement asks par-
ticipants to put a series of pictures in the right order so
that they make a sensible story. Sipps, Berry, and Lynch
(1987) found substantial evidence that supports the use
of Picture Arrangement as a measure of social intelli-
gence distinct from general intelligence as measured by
WAIS Vocabulary. In correlational analyses Picture
Arrangement loads most heavily on the factor referred
to as social understanding (Berger et al., 1993; Lincoln,
Courchesne, Kilman, Elmasian, & Allen, 1988; Muris
et al., 1999). The Social Interpretation Test, SIT (Berger
et al., 1993; Muris et al., 1999), consists of a picture,
depicting a snapshot of daily life: A slight collision
without people being wounded, people discussing it, and
people apparently not at all bothered about it. The in-
struction consists of a standard number of open ques-
tions, such as: ‘‘Tell me something about it.’’ ‘‘Do you
think there is something striking or strange in the pic-
ture?’’ ‘‘What have these people got to do with it?’’ A
results table has been developed for the purpose of nu-
meric scoring. By means of an iterative cluster analysis a
cluster was identified consisting of 24 categorical state-
ments. The SIT scores range from none of the statements
were mentioned (0) to all the statements were mentioned
(24). The SIT has proved its reliability and factorial and
construct validity as a measure of social intelligence
(Evers, van Vliet-Mulder, & ter Laak, 1992). Social IQ
was prorated from Picture Arrangement and SIT by
calculating age weighted percentiles and corresponding
IQ equivalents on the basis of the index norms given in
both test manuals. Higher social IQs reflected greater
ability to interpret social situations.
Social IQ was positively correlated with verbal
IQ (r ¼ :49, p < :05). No other correlations were
significant.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Forty-two adult faces (26 females and 16males) and 32
pairs of shoes were photographed with a Canon Still
Video Camera RC-560 on a Video FloppyDisc VF-50, in
frontal and 3/4 orientation. These photographs were then
prepared as greyscale pictures with an image processing
and production program (Aldus PhotoStyler) for pre-
sentation on a monitor. For every trial, 1 photograph in
frontal view was used as target stimulus, and 2 photo-
graphs in 3/4 view for test stimuli. Pairs of faces were put
together on the basis of comparable hair style. The stimuli
were presented in upright and in inverted orientation.
2.1.3. Procedure
Pilot studies revealed that most of the children per-
formed at chance level when inspection time of the first
stimulus (1 s) and the time out period (3 s) were the sameas for adults. An inspection time of 3 s and a time out
period of 5 s proved to be more appropriate. Because we
learned from comparable tasks that the adolescents with
autism perform at about the same level as 10-year-old
children, these changes were made for the adolescents
with autism as well.
Adult participants were tested in a sound-attenuated
test cabin in the laboratory. Stimuli were presented on a
monitor at a distance of 1.5m. Before starting the ex-
periment, the participants read the instructions for the
task, and then were given a short training with 8 (4
upright and 4 inverted) randomized test trials.
Adolescents with autism and children were tested in a
quiet room at the institute or school. The experimenter
was in the same room as the participant during the en-
tire experiment. Instructions were given both verbally
and visually, with the help of photographs of faces.
Then 8 training trails were administered on the com-
puter. The above chance performance on these trails
indicated that the instructions were understood.
Following the training block, every subject completed
4 experimental blocks of randomized trials. One condi-
tion was tested in every block: face/upright (21 trials),
face/inverted (21 trials), shoe/upright (16 trials), and
shoe/inverted (16 trials). The order was counterbalanced
within each group. The same test pairs were used in the
upright and in the inverted condition, but the photo-
graphs were reversed in half of the trials.
Five hundred milliseconds after an auditory warning
signal, the first stimulus, the target photograph in
frontal view, was shown. After a 2-second interval, the
second stimulus, consisting of 2 photographs in 3/4 view
labeled ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B,’’ was shown. Participants were
instructed to indicate as rapidly as possible which pho-
tograph depicted the same face or shoe as in stimulus 1,
by pressing one of the two response buttons (also
labeled ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B’’). The stimuli disappeared when a
response was given or when the time out period was
exceeded. The intertrial interval was 3 s.
2.2. Results
Results were analyzed for correct responses (Fig. 1a)
and forRTof correct responses (Fig. 1b). Individualswith
a z-score below 1.65 (60% correct) were considered to
respond at chance level and were excluded from analyses.
One male participant with autism was excluded for this
reason.
Because the forced-choice recognition task was some-
what different from the standard inversion paradigm, the
first analysis served to replicate the selective inversion
effect for faces in normal adults, using repeated measures
ANOVA with Orientation (upright versus inverted) and
Type of Stimulus (face versus shoe) as within-subject
factors. Post hoc paired-samples t tests were used to
explore significant interactions. Then, using the same
Fig. 1. Experiment 1: Inversion task. (a) Mean percentage correct
scores of the groups of adolescents with autism and adults and children
with typical development. (b) Mean RT scores of the groups of ado-
lescents with autism and adults and children with typical development.
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adolescents with autism were analyzed separately.
2.2.1. Adults
The selective inversion effect for faces (interaction
OrientationType of Stimulus) was found in the adult
group, both in accuracy [F ð1; 15Þ ¼ 18:20, p < :001] and
in RTs [F ð1; 15Þ ¼ 5:26, p < :05]. Upright faces were
recognized more accurate [tð15Þ ¼ 4:98, p < :001] and
faster [tð15Þ ¼ 3:29, p < :005] than inverted faces, while
there were no differences in accuracy [tð15Þ ¼ 0:62, n.s.]
and RT [tð15Þ ¼ 1:83, n.s.] between upright and inverted
shoes.
2.2.2. Children
For children, the OrientationType of Stimulus in-
teraction was only significant in the accuracy data
[F ð1; 23Þ ¼ 4:52, p < :05] and not in RTs [F ð1; 23Þ ¼
3:29, n.s.]. Faces were recognized better in the upright
than in the inverted mode [tð23Þ ¼ 4:34, p < :001], while
shoes were not recognized better upright [tð23Þ ¼ 1:30,
n.s.]. Both main effects in the RTs were highly significant
for children: faces were recognized faster than shoes
[F ð1; 23Þ ¼ 100:19, p < :001] and upright stimuli were
recognized faster than inverted stimuli [F ð1; 23Þ ¼ 63:18,
p < :001].
2.2.3. Adolescents with autism
In this relatively easy forced-choice recognition test,
adolescents with autism also showed the face inversion
effect like the adults and children; the interaction Ori-
entationType of Stimulus was significant both in ac-
curateness [F ð1; 15Þ ¼ 12:00, p < :005] and in RTs
[F ð1; 15Þ ¼ 4:80, p < :05]. Faces were recognized better[tð15Þ ¼ 2:86, p < :05] and faster [tð15Þ ¼ 3:57, p < :01]
when presented upright, while performance on shoes
was not sensitive to orientation [accuracy: tð15Þ ¼ 1:14,
n.s; RT: tð15Þ ¼ 2:04, n.s.].
Significant correlations of social IQ on accuracy with
the upright condition (r ¼ :70, p < :005) but not with
the inverted condition (r ¼ :34, n.s.) suggest that indi-
viduals with autism with a higher social IQ were spe-
cifically more accurate in recognizing upright stimuli.
2.3. Discussion
The first experiment was conducted to determine
whether the previous findings that people with autism
show no inversion effect for faces (Hobson et al., 1988;
Langdell, 1978; Tantam et al., 1989) could be replicated
with reduced task demands. We found that this was not
the case. The response pattern of the adolescents with
autism was very similar to that of the adults and the
typically developing children in this task. Thus, in con-
trast to the studies by Hobson et al. (1988) and Langdell
(1978), the individuals with autism in this experiment
were not superior to the controls in recognizing upside-
down faces, nor did the present results confirm the
finding of Tantam et al. (1989) that they were as accu-
rate on inverted faces as on upright faces. Like the
children and adults, they recognized upright faces more
accurately and faster than inverted faces. Furthermore,
for the individuals with autism the inversion effect was
also larger for faces than for shoes. Various aspects of
this general pattern of results require comment.
A first comment concerns the results obtained here
with the adult group. The primary use of an adult
control group is to establish a baseline concerning typ-
ical performance with the specific materials and task
used with the clinical population. It is clear from the
present adult data that the classical inversion effect ob-
tains here for faces but not for objects.
Secondly, our data show that typically developing
children do show an inversion effect. This finding is in-
consistent with earlier reports by Carey and Diamond
(1994) but it is entirely compatible with more recent
studies (Tanaka, Kay, Grinnel, Stansfield, & Szechter,
1998). It must be noted, however, that exposure times of
the stimuli were prolonged for children and adolescents
with autism. Although both groups still made more er-
rors than the adult group, it is conceivable that the
prolonged exposure time allows the inversion effect to
emerge to the same extent in children and adolescents
with autism as in adults. On the other hand, one might
argue that longer exposure times encourage a feature-
based strategy. However, we have seen in two earlier
studies that this is not the case for adult populations (de
Gelder, Bachoud-Levy, & Degos, 1998; de Gelder &
Rouw, 2000). In these studies adults without neuropsy-
chological disorders were compared to patients with
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that with prolonged exposure of the target stimuli still
significantly better results were obtained in the upright
face condition than in the inverted condition, suggesting
that even with unlimited exposure times a configuration-
based strategy was used. Our present results indicate
that this is true for the children too.
Our data show a normal inversion effect with most
high-ability adolescents with autism when the task de-
mands in a recognition task for unfamiliar faces are re-
duced, suggesting that the findings of Tantam et al. (1989)
may be due to floor effects. However, there are also indi-
cations in the present study that at least some individuals
with autism perform relatively poor with upright pre-
sentation. Accuracy in this mode of presentation was
correlated with social IQ in this group, suggesting that
adolescents with a low social IQ do not profit as much
from upright presentation of the stimuli as the individuals
with higher social IQs. Therefore, the present results do
not replicate the results that people with autism are better
in recognizing inverted faces as is suggested by the studies
by Langdell (1978) and Hobson et al. (1988), but suggest
that some people with autism—those with a low social
IQ—are worse in recognizing normal upright stimuli.
Note that this poor recognition not only concerns faces
but also objects in the present study, a result that is not
consistent with other findings (e.g., Boucher & Lewis,
1992; Tantam et al., 1989). However, impaired recogni-
tion of unfamiliar faces in people with autism was re-
ported in other studies (Boucher & Lewis, 1992; de
Gelder, Vroomen, & van der Heide, 1991). Boucher,
Lewis, and Collis (1998) also demonstrated impaired
familiar face recognition in children with autism, but in
Langdells study no such impairment was found. A pos-
sible explanation for a relatively good recognition of fa-
miliar faces might be that some individuals with autism
encode faces in a qualitatively different way that is less
sensitive to inversion. This other processing style is less
efficient when new, unfamiliar faces have to be encoded,
but is accurate enough to perform well on familiar face
recognition tasks.
If we follow Diamond and Carey (1986), the re-
markable absence of an inversion effect in previous
studies suggests that people with autism rely less on
configural information in face encoding. Our results
indicate that this might only be true for individuals
with low social intelligence. If there is a subgroup of
adolescents with autism that indeed encode faces in a
non-configural way, then other tasks where configural
information is critical should also show a deviant re-
sponse pattern. Young et al. (1987) developed a task in
which they fused top and bottom halves of different
familiar faces to form a new facial configuration. Par-
ticipants were then asked to name the upper part of
these composite faces. They found that recognition is
more impaired when the top and bottom halves werealigned to form a new configuration than when they
were not, but only when the stimuli were presented
upright. This composite effect was also found with
unfamiliar faces, both in the same paradigm (Young
et al., 1987), and in a matching task paradigm (Hole,
1994). Carey and Diamond (1994) obtained the com-
posite effect for 6- and 10-year-old children.
In Experiment 2 an adapted version of the composite
task was administered to determine if adolescents with
autism, especially those with low social IQ scores, are
less affected by manipulations of the facial configura-
tion. As in Experiment 1, memory demands were re-
duced by presenting a two-alternative forced-choice test
directly after presentation of each target stimulus.3. Experiment 2: The composite task
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The same adolescents with autism and children who
participated in Experiment 1 completed the task. There
were at least 2 and at most 7 days between Experiments
1 and 2 for each participant of these groups. For the
adult group, a new group of 24 undergraduates (12 fe-
males and 12 males; mean age 22;4 years) was recruited.
3.1.2. Stimuli
Still video photographs of faces in frontal view were
used to prepare the composite stimuli. The images were
split into top and bottom halves using an image pro-
gram (Aldus PhotoStyler). Test stimuli consisted of
aligned and non-aligned composites of top and
bottom halves of different faces, in inverted and upright
orientation. The target faces were upright and inverted
photographs of the same individuals in 3/4 view
(Appendix B).
3.1.3. Procedure
Inspection timeof the first stimulus and timeout period
were longer for children and adolescents with autism than
for adults for reasons given in Experiment 1.
Participants were tested in the same circumstances
and with the same equipment as in Experiment 1. Adults
received written instructions. Children and adolescents
with autism were instructed both verbally and visually,
with the use of photographs of the stimuli. Before every
experimental block, a training block of 9 randomized
trials for that condition was given. Four experimental
blocks of 20 randomized trials were administered. The
conditions were upright/aligned, upright/non-aligned,
inverted/aligned, and inverted/non-aligned. The condi-
tions were counterbalanced within each group.
Five hundred milliseconds after the audio warning
signal the target face was presented on the monitor for 1
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After an ISI of 3 s the two probes were shown: the top
half of the target face and the top half of a distracter
face, each in combination with the same bottom half of
a third face. The task was to indicate as quickly as
possible which of the 2 top halves belonged to the target
face by pressing one of 2 buttons (also labelled ‘‘A’’ and
‘‘B’’). The stimulus disappeared when a response was
given. The inter-trial interval was 3 s.
3.2. Results
The results were analyzed for correct responses
(Fig. 2a) and for RT of correct responses (Fig. 2b). It
was assumed that individuals with a z-score below 1.65
(58% correct) had responded at chance level, and they
were excluded from analyses. One male participant with
autism was excluded for this reason.
The same analyses as in Experiment 1 were carried
out, but this time using Orientation (upright versus in-
verted) and Composition (aligned versus non-aligned) as
within-subject factors.
3.2.1. Adults
The composite effect is defined as better performance
on non-aligned relative to aligned photographs and is
strengthened by the finding that the pattern is found only
in the upright condition. This interaction was significant
in theRT analysis [F ð1; 23Þ ¼ 6:12, p < :05] but not in the
accuracy data [F ð1; 23Þ ¼ 2:04, n.s.]: in the upright mode,
non-aligned faces were recognized faster than aligned
faces [tð23Þ ¼ 4:55, p < :001], while there was no com-
posite effect in the inverted mode [tð23Þ ¼ 0:18, n.s.].Fig. 2. Experiment 2: Composite task. (a) Mean percentage correct
scores of the groups of adolescents with autism and adults and children
with typical development. (b) Mean RT scores of the groups of ado-
lescents with autism and adults and children with typical development.A main effect on Orientation showed that photo-
graphs were recognized far more accurately in the up-
right condition [F ð1; 23Þ ¼ 73:69, p < :001].3.2.2. Children
In the children group, only a main effect of Orienta-
tion was found: upright photographs were recognized
more accurately than inverted photographs [F ð1; 23Þ ¼
53:71, p < :001]. The crucial OrientationComposite
interaction was not found in the RT data [F ð1; 23Þ ¼
0:54, n.s.] and just failed to reach significance on accu-
racy [F ð1; 23Þ ¼ 4:05, p < :6].
3.2.3. Adolescents with autism
The adolescents with autism showed no composite
effects in RTs [F ð1; 15Þ ¼ 0:62, n.s.] or accuracy
[F ð1; 15Þ ¼ 0:28, n.s.]. Only a main effect on orientation
was significant: they were more accurate in the upright
than in the inverted condition [F ð1; 15Þ ¼ 15:10,
p < :001].
Task performance in general was correlated with so-
cial IQ (r ¼ :55, p < :05) and age (r ¼ :58, p < :05).3.3. Discussion
The goal of Experiment 2 was to obtain evidence
about the importance of overall configuration from a
different task. Results would also allow us to assess
whether the deviant performance of some of the ado-
lescents with autism on the inversion tasks in Experi-
ment 1 could be attributed to the use of a non-configural
processing style. The data show some correspondences
and some deviations with configuration-based process-
ing as measured in the inversion task.
A first comment concerns the adult results which are
consistent with previous studies by Young et al. (1987)
and Carey and Diamond (1994): non-aligned compos-
ites were recognized faster than aligned composites in
the upright presentation mode. The results of the chil-
dren with typical development were also compatible
with the findings of the Carey and Diamond (1994)
study with 10-year-old children, although the composite
effect in our study was only marginal. The Compos-
iteOrientation interaction in the present experiment
just failed to reach significance.
In the present experiment, no composite effect was
found for the adolescents with autism. Unlike suggested
by Experiment 1, it was not the case that a non-configural
processing style might be shown selectively by a subgroup
of individuals with autism with a low social IQ. The re-
sults of the composite task are in line with the hypothesis
that individuals with autism make less use of the confi-
gural information of a face, but are not in accordancewith
the results of the inversion task. Apparently, some other
factor is involved in the composite task.
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The objective of this study was to examine the exis-
tence of an inversion and a composite effect in typically
developing children and to determine whether the pre-
viously reported absence of an inversion effect in ado-
lescents with autism on tasks where photographs of
faces were presented upside-down (Hobson et al., 1988;
Langdell, 1978; Tantam et al., 1989) was related to a
deficit in the use of the configural information of the
face. The first experiment re-examined the inversion ef-
fect and avoided floor effects by administering a recog-
nition task of inverted faces with reduced memory
demands. Adolescents with autism performed normally
under these circumstances and showed an inversion ef-
fect for faces with only a subgroup with a low social IQ
score being less sensitive to orientation. To the extent
that the inversion effect results from configural pro-
cessing (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Scapinello & Yarmey,
1970; Yin, 1969), this suggests that the majority of the
individuals with autism is able to process a face on the
basis of its configuration.
In a second Experiment where the configural pro-
cessing was tested using composite faces we did not
observe evidence of a normal composite effect in the
group with autism. This suggests that either they were
not processing faces as configurations at least not in this
task, or that besides configural processing, another
factor is involved in performing the composite task. We
discuss these two alternatives in turn.
First we would like to point out that the results ob-
tained with the adult group establishes that the inversion
and the composite effects can be found with unfamiliar
faces using a paradigm that does not involve training
but involves recognition of personal identity across a
difference in viewing angle. However, the composite ef-
fect was not as solid in the children group, for it did not
reach significance. Apparently, the specific task de-
mands were less advantageous for this group to find a
reliable CompositeOrientation interaction. A major
difference between the study by Carey and Diamond
(1994) and the present one concerns the degree of fa-
miliarity with the faces. Their studies concerned a
composite effect for familiar faces. They also claim that
the effect holds for unfamiliar faces, but as there was
extensive learning of the face halves and a requirement
to name them, it is questionable whether these face
halves were processed as unfamiliar faces. Furthermore,
since the learned face halves were exactly identical to the
face halves in the composite faces, task performance on
the basis of overall similarity was very likely. This crit-
icism was formulated by Hole (1994), whose study
tackled this problem by using a matching paradigm. The
results showed that in this paradigm the composite effect
also holds for unfamiliar faces. However, Hole only
compared upright composites with inverted composites,but did not compare aligned composite faces with non-
aligned composites. This makes a definite conclusion
about the existence of a composite effect for unfamiliar
faces difficult. In the present experiment, a more stan-
dard paradigm for unfamiliar face processing was used
that did not require learning of the faces. The target
faces were presented as a whole (instead of only showing
the upper part as in the other studies) in 3/4 orientations.
To reduce memory demands, the two composite faces in
frontal orientation immediately followed the target face.
This paradigm prevented recognition purely based on
similarity, since the top halves of the target and com-
posite faces were not identical as was the case in the
studies just mentioned. Instead, the target faces in our
study had to be encoded specifically as faces and not as
patterns. However, the composite task not only requires
face encoding, as in the inversion task, but also detec-
tion of a target in an embedding context.
Some of the most relevant studies on configurable
encoding were conducted in the seventies and concern
the object and face superiority effects, the notion that
array goodness or good context helps in detection of a
part. In a convincing paper in which normal and
scrambled faces were used as stimuli, Mermelstein,
Banks, and Prinzmetal (1979) demonstrated that figures
of good form lead to face superiority effects, but only
when the context stimulus has to be kept in memory (the
context stimulus is presented first, followed by the part
to be recognized). If the part is presented first, followed
by the context stimulus (and thus no memory for the
context stimulus is needed), it becomes a perceptual task
and then a face inferiority effect is found. Mermelstein
et al. looked at face processing, but addressed the issue
of context effects in such a way that the generalization to
objects is clear and they integrated the existing studies
about the phenomena that have used objects (Weisstein
& Harris, 1974) or faces (Homa, Haver, & Schwartz,
1976).
Pursuing this line, it appears that the studies on the
composite effect are perception based, as the task is a
visual search of the composite faces. The results of the
participants with typical development are consistent
with the prediction made by Mermelstein et al. (1979),
that, in this case, a face inferiority effect will be found. In
contrast, individuals with autism did not show a com-
posite effect, suggesting that their visual search strategies
are influenced to a much lesser degree by the embedding
context. This absence of an inferiority effect in people
with autism is also found in studies that used stimuli
other than faces. In the Embedded Figures task, chil-
dren with autism were found to be superior in finding
the hidden target in a camouflaging context (Shah &
Frith, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). People with
autism also perform remarkably well on the Block De-
sign task (Bowler, 1992; Lockeyer & Rutter, 1970; Ohta,
1987; Tymchuk, Simmons, & Neafsey, 1977; Venter,
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to copy a given pattern with small building blocks as
quickly as possible. Shah and Frith (1993) showed, by
presenting different variations of the Block Design task,
that this remarkable performance is due to a more fea-
ture-based search strategy, while obliqueness and rota-
tion did not reveal group differences. Both the findings
on the Embedded Figures task and the Block Design
task thus suggest that people with autism make more use
of feature-based strategies in visual search tasks. The
weaker composite effect in the children with typical
development indicates that they also use a more feature-
based search strategy.
At first sight, these findings seem in line with the
theory of Frith (1989) that people with autism exhibit a
weak central coherence, an inability to integrate pieces
of information into coherent wholes. However, on basis
of this theory it is not clear why most adolescents with
autism in the present study show a normal inversion
effect, since this presupposes that a normal, configura-
tion-based, face representation had been formed (Dia-
mond & Carey, 1986). In other words, piecemeal
information of the face (eyes, nose, mouth) apparently
had been integrated into the coherent whole of a face.
The results indicate that if this is a valuable explanation,
only a subgroup of adolescents with autism with a
low social intelligence may suffer from a weak central
coherence.
To conclude, our data suggest that most adoles-
cents with autism do not suffer from an inability to
form a configuration-based face representation, but
that they are less prone to use contextual information
in a perceptual task. This is in line with a recent study
of Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999), who found, in
linguistic processing tasks, that individuals with au-
tism will not use contextual information, unless they
are instructed to do so or unless they make a con-
scious decision to do so. In individuals with typical
development, this contextual information seems to
activate automatically a holistic processing of the
stimulus, which is why they have to suppress the
tendency to perceive an embedding figure as a Gestalt
in a visual search task (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, &
Karp, 1971). Individuals with autism do not need to
suppress this tendency, and will use primary a feature-
based strategy. This may also explain the finding that,
when photographs of faces can be categorized on
basis of type of hat (feature-based) or facial expres-
sion (configuration-based), typically developing chil-
dren will prefer sorting by expression and children
with autism prefer sorting by type of hat (Weeks &
Hobson, 1987). In some exceptional situations, as in
performing the Embedding Figures task, this strategy
may be effective, but in most daily life situations
this is not very adequate for understanding and
anticipating events.Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Petra Piree for as-
sistance in testing the children. We are grateful to the
staff and pupils of the Dr. Leo Kannerhuis, Oosterbeek,
and of Basisschool De Helle, Tilburg. We are indebted
to Paul Bertelson and Hans Berger for valuable discus-
sion.Appendix A
An example of the face stimuli used in Experiment 1.
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